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Although the current global economic crisis has revealed flaws in the capitalist system, 
some countries have to grapple in addition with problems of their own making: “Spain 
had allowed a massive housing bubble to develop and is now suffering from near-total 
collapse of its real estate market. In contrast to the United States, however, Spain’s 
banking regulations have allowed its banks to withstand a much bigger trauma with 
better results - though, not surprisingly, its overall economy has been hit far worse” 
(Stiglitz, 2010, 21-22). This statement summarises a diagnosis of Spain’s situation in 
the spring of 2010. But was there a specific design that gave rise to Spain’s problems? 
Whereas much has been written on the economic weakness of a model heavily 
based on the construction industry, little attention has been given to the internal 
regulations, policies, social and cultural factors in which the Spanish urban growth 
model was embedded. The question insufficiently addressed by current debates is 
therefore: to what extent is Spain’s current crisis the result of its urban economic and 
social growth model?  
 David Harvey was the first to stress that “the power to organize space derives 
from a whole complex of forces mobilized by diverse social agents” (1989, p. 4). This 
applies to the issue addressed here: how was the massive expansion of the housing 
market engineered in Spain through the combined actions of international and national 
regulators, real estate brokers, financial sectors and local administrations as well as 
citizens and residents? In order to answer this question I propose to look at the 
articulation between: (a) the financing of the real estate market in combination with a 
structure of incentives, which has had serious consequences for housing ownership and 
the current housing crisis, and (b) path-dependent cultural practices, consumption 
patterns and demographic transformations as part of the explanation. A second question 
is: who are the loss bearers in this crisis? This question links the real estate crisis with 
its effects on unemployment in Spain.  
 In this paper I argue that the crisis in the Spanish urban growth model reveals a 
particular interaction of globalizing forces with national and local processes, 
characterised by specific structures of economic incentives as well as with path-
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dependent cultural traits. The combination of these factors goes some way towards an 
explanation of the housing bubble. The specific combination of factors, however, makes 
the outlook for the aftermath of the housing bubble in Spain different from that 
experienced in the United States. The major differences that exist between countries are 
partly the result of their histories, but are also due to different policy choices made by 
governments and institutional regulators. In Spain, the Central Bank’s regulations 
prevented the banking system from developing “subprime mortgages”,1 but not from 
contributing through abundant credit to an overcapacity of the housing sector (close to a 
million units for sale in 2009)2. The bursting of the housing bubble contributed directly 
and indirectly to the 2.3 million job losses and a large private debt. However, since 
Spain is de facto a federal country, it is possible to observe some city (& regional) 
variations in the creation of and reactions to the crisis. Some examples will serve to 
illustrate this. The article first provides an introduction to the previous growth model 
with special emphasis on the housing market, then focuses on the actors involved in the 
housing bubble, and goes on to consider the sociological implications of the crisis and 
governmental policies in the aftermath.  
 
Globalization factors in Spanish urban growth: the Europeanization factor  
For almost a quarter of a century till 2007, Spanish growth was closely linked to 
Europeanization, and latterly also to globalization. The start of EU (EEC) membership 
in January 1986 saw the Spanish economy begin a process of convergence with other 
European economies; the country entered the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 
1994, with full membership of the European Union (EU) translating into financial 
support from that organisation’s structural and cohesive funds3. Entering the European 
Union (the European Economic Community at the time) was indubitably positive for 
the Spanish economy. GDP per capita increased from 72.5% to 97.2% in the period 
1985-20044 compared to the other EU15 members (100). Tourism and commercial 
benefits are good indicators of the positive implications of Europeanization: 87% of 
tourists, 74 % of exports and 66% of imports are of EU origin (Royo, 2006).   
                                                 
1 Law 19/1992, of 7th July, which regulates the securitisation of mortgage loans and the new Law 
41/2007, of 7th December, regulating the mortgage market. Further, unlike what happens in the USA, the 
Spanish mortgage market is client-based and not transaction-based. 
2 An internal document of the Ministry of Housing specified a total number of 997,562 housing units for 
sale, including those to be finished during the year. In Doncel, EL PAIS, 11/6/2009. 
3 These represented only a total of 1% of Spanish GDP (1.5 between 1994 and 1999). 
4 In 2004 the number of EU member states grew to 25 with the incorporation of 10 new countries; the 
denominated statistical effect changed the percentage for Spanish GDP in relation to the EU. 
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Europeanization and globalization contributed to an average yearly growth of 
3.5% between 1994 and 2007. Globalization became highly visible in Spain from 2002 
onwards, as large numbers of immigrants entered the county – 5.6 million between 1998 
and 2009 (De la Dehesa, 2009, 443-444). Foreign migrants concentrated in the areas 
where the job market was expanding: basically, the capital region (Madrid), the 
Mediterranean coast and the islands5. But financial capital had preceded human capital. 
At the beginning of the 21st century the massive inward flow of direct foreign 
investment was well underway. With the introduction of the Euro, Spain gained 
international investors’ confidence as an investment site and obtained a triple-A credit 
rating. As a result, in 2008 Spain ranked next to the United States in the league of 
countries with the largest net import of capital (IMF-World Economic Outlook, 2009). 
This private foreign investment fuelled the economy, especially the real estate sector. 
Direct foreign investment in real estate increased by 102% between 1998 and 2006 
(Banco de España, 2007, 45). As the construction industry, and then the tourist industry, 
gained a larger share of the market (11-12%6 and 11% respectively), economic growth 
and urban growth became practically synonymous.  
Globalizing factors, such as the combination of large numbers of foreigners and 
foreign investment, permeated not only the two largest cities - Madrid and Barcelona -, 
but also the Mediterranean coast7. As the economy grew, cities flourished; Madrid was 
the city that benefited most from Spain’s full membership of the EU, as governmental 
and commercial organisations chose to locate their offices in the capital (Leal, 2008) 
thereby bringing or encouraging direct foreign investment. Barcelona did not attract 
equivalent investments, but being an outstanding example of urban regeneration, 
attracted large numbers of tourists and visitors to economic fairs (Degen & García, 
2008; Marshall, 2004). Bilbao followed a similar strategy with the “Guggenheim effect” 
and with the advantage of already having a background of solid local innovative 
industries (Plaza, 2006). In addition, the contribution of EU funds enabled the 
modernisation of large infrastructures all over Spain –including high speed trains -, 
which helped to reduce the historical development gap between rich and poor regions. 
                                                 
5 In 2005, at the peak of the boom period, a total of 80% of foreigners lived in Madrid (21%), Catalonia 
(22%), the Valencian Community (15.5%) and Andalusia (11.3%) and the Canarias and Balearic islands 
(10%) in López de Lera, 2006, 245) 
6 Variations exist between different statistical sources. 
7 For example direct foreign investment in real estate demand increased 102% between 1998 and 2006 
(Banco de España, 2007, 49) 
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In the Mediterranean, with the economic boom (1994-2007), cities like Valencia and 
Malaga gained prominence (Prytherch, 2006).  
Investment in transport infrastructures helped the real estate market to take off by 
supporting suburbanization and an increase in inter urban mobility through boosting car 
culture at the same time. Urban sprawl consolidated around large cities with the 
construction of large housing blocks and housing complexes called “urbanizaciones” 
(estates of semi-detached houses). This model also started to characterise medium size 
cities along the Mediterranean coast, fuelled by tourism. Some urban centres 
experienced a remarkable urban expansion (Malaga, Murcia and Alicante), partly 
because they attracted foreign residents8. 
 
Ten years of economic growth lead to private debt growth   
The long economic cycle of the Spanish economy’s between the years 1997-
2007 was accompanied by ever lower interest rates, with an average of 4.65% Tasa 
Annual Equivalente  (Annual Equivalent Rate), less than two points above inflation. 
The decrease in nominal interest rates contributed to a large internal household demand 
for credit to invest in housing and consumer durables9. Although housing prices 
increased rapidly - the strongest growth (16%) took place between 2002 and 2005 - the 
good performance of the economy and employment encouraged further demand for 
housing. But the housing boom led to a huge increase in debt. For one thing, the number 
of instalments of mortgage payments increased, causing a prolonged period of 
household debt. Moreover, the average annual increase of credit to the housing buyer 
was 20%, which explains the current household debt (home debt amounts to 74% of 
total household debt)10. Also, the expansion of financial credit to real estate developers 
grew from 5% to 17%, i.e. 12% in ten years (1997-2007). Lastly, in order to meet 
demand from housing owners, construction industries and real estate developers, 
financial institutions (mainly banks and saving banks) borrowed from European and 
Asian financial markets.  
                                                 
8 Between 2001 and 2008, Alicante increased its population by 401.212 inhabitants; Malaga in 261.021 
and Murcia in 235.731. (INE, Población). In the same period the number of housing units increased by 
265.081 in Alicante; 298.376 in Malaga and 183.496 (Ministerio de Vivienda). 
9 The short and long term nominal interests fell from 13.3 and 11.7 % to 3.0 and 4.7% respectively. This 
contributed to companies’ investment in hiring workers and equipment goods costs.  
10 Consumer debt was 11% and other loans 15%. Spanish household debt has risen over 84% of the 
annual GDP in December 2009 according to the European Central Bank.  See European Parliament, 
Directorate General for Internal Policies, 2010, 3-4. 
 5 
The exceptional conditions of availability of financial credit caused a huge 
internal demand in the period which fuelled the housing bubble with the above-
mentioned yearly rise in houses prices11. As is often the case with housing bubbles, 
there was a general perception of wealth increase felt by homeowners and real estate 
agents (Stiglitz, 2010; Rodriguez López & Fellinger Jusué, 2007). Home owners 
overestimated the value of their home, more so the middle and low income groups, 
while acknowledging that the price implied an overvaluation12. However, optimism 
combined with fear of future price increases encouraged housing acquisition. (García-
Montalvo, 2006).  
 
The Housing boom and home ownership: a structure of economic incentives 
and sociological factors 
For over a decade the construction sector contributed to Spain’s economic 
growth, 1 to 1.5 points higher than the European average (Gurria, 2009). Between 1998 
and 2007, the housing stock increased by around 5.7 million units (29.6%) (Banco de 
España, 2007, 42). From the supply side, the housing construction industry was first 
boosted by increasingly available land on urban peripheries since 199013. In the year 
2007 the introduction of a new Land Act provided new criteria limiting the expansion of 
urbanised land, but only when the existing urban sprawl around large, medium and even 
small-size cities was already consolidated14. Irrespective of whether the cities were 
governed by conservatives, social democrats or even leftwing politicians, the dynamics 
of housing growth proved to be consistent and similar everywhere. What varied were 
the proportions in housing growth, checks on corruption practices and the 
accompanying measures taken by some regional governments (Autonomous 
Communities) to regenerate existing neighbourhoods. 
                                                 
11 The Banco de España has estimated that the overvaluation in housing prices is between 24 and 35%. In 
García-Motalvo, 2006, 7. 
 
12 In a survey study conducted in five cities: Coruña,, Madrid y Barcelona, Murcia and Valencia 94.5% 
replied that housing was overestimated. In García-Motalvo, 2006, 33. 
 
13 Already the Land Act of 1990, with a Socialist government, gave local and regional administrations the 
faculty to promote and benefit from the urbanization process through real estate transactions and the 
capacity to buy land by administrations and change rural into urban land. Further, the Land Act of 1998, 
with a Conservative government, simplified land regulations, effectively liberalising land for 
development. 
14 For a comprehensive analysis of the Land Act see the XXIX issue Ciudad y Territorio, (2007) 
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Most of the housing production was intended for sale, as home ownership 
features strongly in the Spanish urban growth model. Spain’s home ownership (over 
80%) is one the highest in the world, behind Hungary and some regions of Poland. This 
contrasts with 70% in the UK, 55% in France and 43% in Germany. Differences exist in 
Spain between regions. For the 2001 census data the comparisons hold: the Basque 
Country (89%), the Valencia region (86.3 %), Madrid (81.9 %) and Catalonia (79.0%) 
(OECD, 2007). Home ownership is, however, a path-dependent practice in Spain. 
Already in 1981, long before the recent housing-ownership boom, as many as 73.1% of 
housing units were owner-occupied. The economic explanation for this factor is rooted 
in the 1970s, when inflation was very high and mortgage interests were fixed, 
encouraging families to locate their savings in housing ownership. Home ownership 
was accessible across all social classes, helped by the construction of large housing 
blocks on the peripheries of the largest cities, sold to workers at low prices. Moreover, 
from that time onwards middle class families started also to invest in second residences 
in the countryside around larger cities and on the Mediterranean coast. 
When the economic boom started in 1994, real estate agents and developers 
seized the opportunity to enlarge the housing market, helped by financial and 
government officials, who created a system of incentives. In this context the majority of 
the population in Spain was happy to take advantage of the opportunity for home 
ownership with relatively easy and low-interests loans. Governments (both conservative 
and socialist) introduced fiscal incentives for the purchase of homes (first and second 
residences). There is, however, a more complex socio- institutional explanation.  
In Spain, like in the other Southern European countries, people have traditionally 
relied on family provision for welfare (Andreotti, et al, 2001). Housing provision is 
often a family concern, with parents helping in the purchase of homes by newly formed 
couples within the family institution (Arbuci, 2007; Allen, et al, 2004). Thus family 
solidarity has become part of a cultural practice across all social classes. The following 
table provides indications of the extent to which family financial support is important in 
housing purchase. The data is based on a survey15 conducted in 2005 in five Spanish 
cities.  
 
                                                 
15 The sampling is base 1,509 interviews in five cities (361 in Barcelona; 360 in Madrid; 296 in Valencia; 
246 in Murcia and 246 in Coruña). In García-Motalvo, 2006, 16. 
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Table 1. Proportion of buyers with financial support from their families  
Cities  Years of acquisition Socio-economic group 
Barcelona 23.2% 2000 14.7% High 23.5% 
Madrid 23.9% 2001 23.6% Medium-
high 
21.5% 
Murcia 19.1% 2002 18.0% Medium 19.6% 
Coruña 19.8% 2003 22.5% Medium-low 9.5% 
Valencia 13.0% 2004 16.0%   
Total 19.9% 2005 25.0%   
  Source: García-Montalvo, 2006, 36. 
 
 The above table shows that about 20% of respondents received financial support 
from the family for housing acquisition. It also shows that the higher the income, the 
more generous the support. In Madrid and Barcelona, more generous support coincided 
with higher housing prices16. What is significant, however, is the relatively low support 
the medium-low income groups can count on from family members, making them more 
likely to become indebted and thus exposed when the housing bubble eventually burst.  
To sum up: incentives towards ownership were very strong for Spanish citizens 
and residents, not only because financial institutions were lending money easily and at a 
low rate, but also because fiscal policies made housing ownership tax deductable and 
therefore advantageous. This structure of investments was reinforced by family 
solidarity across society, albeit less so in the medium-low income groups. 
 
Who were the buyers?  
Newly built houses were going to be owned and occupied by newly-formed 
couples, products of the baby boom of the 1970s, by new single parents –as the numbers 
of divorcees increased - and by the growing number of childless singles and couples – 
these two groups often opted for central neighbourhoods rather than the suburbs. The 
changing composition of households - with increasing numbers of singles and single 
parents - stimulated housing demand17. Demographic factors were altered by the notable 
                                                 
16 Housing prices have systematically been higher in Barcelona and Madrid (Sociedad de Tasación, 2009, 
7) 
17 The number of single-person and single-parent households, which rose from 366,000 in 1998 (24.6% of 
the total) to over 540,000 (36.3% of the total) in 2005. In Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Familiares 
(Spanish Household Expenditure Survey), the latest available results for which are for 2005. 
 8 
impact of immigrations. “High numbers of migrants from developing countries 
contributed to the exhaustion of the small rental market, putting more pressure on the 
housing market as a whole, thus leading to an increase in the construction of housing 
units in areas with a larger immigrant population” (Leal, 2008, 34-35). In support of 
Leal’s argument, it must be borne in mind that immigration to Spain reached 12% of the 
population by 2009 (from 1.6% in 1998)18. Apart from immigrant workers and their 
families, other groups of foreigners found their niche in Spain, from northern European 
pensioners (particularly British and German, but also other Europeans) to a more 
heterogeneous group of residents working or studying in cities, and last but not least, 
seasonal tourists who acquired or rented flats, also mainly along the Mediterranean 
coast (including the Balearic Islands).  
The category that completes the picture of buyers is that of investors and 
speculators, who expected a good return on their investment in buying a flat as housing 
prices increased yearly. In a study already cited, it was found that 37.2% of the 
respondents acknowledge that either themselves or a family member or a friend has 
bought or sold a house as a commercial transaction (García-Montalvo, 2006, 39). Thus, 
the dream of improving one’s capital or savings spread like a virus. No doubt also “the 
black economy explains something about the propensity to invest in housing (…) as a 
form of savings available for investing black money” (Allen et al, 2004, 98). As owners 
opted for selling rather than renting to make quick profits, this generated a vicious 
circle, shrinking the rental housing stock. This is one of the explanations for the fact that 
even immigrants and young couples were induced to buy, the first group at high risk, 
the second with the financial support of parents. 
Finally, a market developed for second homes, amounting to 16.0% of total 
housing. Second homes are mainly concentrated along the Mediterranean coast (41.4% 
of the total), but a considerable proportion of owners live in the larger cities. As many 
as 40.2% of households located in the provinces of the six larger cities in Spain 
(Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, Zaragoza, Bilbao and Seville), owned 50% of the 
secondary residences in Spain, whether these were in their vicinity or on the coast (Leal, 
2006, 468).  
To sum up: the purchase of housing increased considerably in the boom period 
due to demographic factors (for first residences) and to consumption of and investment 
                                                 
18 INE (2009). Población. 
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in housing (for secondary and other-use residences). In order to give an idea of the 
relevance of this last factor: the percentage of households with other properties in 
addition to their first residence went from 30.1 % to 34.5% in just the few years 
between 2002 and 2005 (De la Dehesa, 2009, 449). 
 
A segmented housing market 
The economic boom correlated with home ownership expansion, but in a 
housing market that reflected and generated strong social inequalities, as can be seen in 
the clear differences in accessibility for the population. Several deviations are worth 
mentioning: (1) Housing accessibility has been restricted for the young by the increase 
in housing prices. In combination with the low-paid and temporary jobs, this has 
postponed the age at which they leave the parental nest (the highest in Europe, along 
with Italy). Fault lines appeared between young couples whose parents’ savings 
provided the entrance payment for purchase and those couples who could not count on 
family support. (2) High housing prices have forced immigrants to share residences 
(even to share the purchase of flats), resulting in households with more than one family 
or with several adults. Although spatial segregation has been relatively moderate in 
recent years of immigration, one may refer to social segregation in terms of quality of 
life or lack of it - to the point of social exclusion - in overcrowded flats in cities 
(Terrones, 2007). This factor has been exacerbated by the very small amount of 
protected and public housing, which went down proportionally during the 1990s and in 
the 2000s. (3) There is also a territorial imbalance, as the areas most affected by the 
current urban growth model have been the larger cities and the Mediterranean coast 
(Leal, 2008).  
 
Before the current crisis there was visibility of a paradoxical housing structure in 
which accessibility restrictions and underuse of housing space (as much as 14.8% was 
empty according to the 2001 census) created a social and a spatial disequilibrium. Some 
open manifestations emerged in the form of urban protest in the larger cities. As pointed 
out before, young people have suffered, particularly, from restrictions in housing 
accessibility due to increasing housing prices. In 2006 expenditure on non-subsided 
housing for young households amounted to 39% of their income in Spain, but as much 
as 60% in Madrid, 50% in Catalonia and 56.8% in the Basque Country (Observatorio 
Joven de Vivienda en España, 2006 in Camargo, 2009). This was one of the main 
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reasons for a cycle of urban protests organised by young people during 2006 and 2007 
in Madrid, Barcelona and Bilbao. Although regional governments have responded in 
various ways to these mobilizations this has hardly improved the position of the young 
in the housing market19.  
 
The role of local and regional administrations 
All this housing construction and the method of urbanization did not happen in 
an institutional vacuum. On the contrary, local and regional governments were actively 
involved in the process. What made the more progressive municipalities emulate the 
same practice of freeing up land for development? Historically, municipalities in Spain 
– including the largest cities - have suffered from a shortage of financial resources, even 
after the decentralisation to the regions (Autonomous Communities). As a result local 
administrations have found in urban development and city sprawl a way to increase 
their resources through land management and new housing taxes (Impuesto de Bienes 
Inmuebles - IBI) and are thus better equipped to face citizens’ demands and 
expectations for the improvement of services. Thus, the transaction fees linked to 
urbanisation and liberalisation of land, coupled with local fiscal competences over 
housing construction, have provided local administrations (municipal and regional) with 
the resources needed to modernise cities.  
However, the limits of what modernisation means have sometimes been blurred, 
to the extent that in some cases the housing boom became irrational and dysfunctional, 
such as in the south and south east of Spain, where urban developments and golf 
courses overburden limited water reserves. In most cases, protests mounted by civic 
organisations and ecological groups have been ignored. Part of the problem was the lack 





Coping with the housing crisis: Who is most affected? What has been done? 
                                                 
19 The provision of subsidised housing is the responsibility of the city and regional administrations in 
Spain. In her thesis Camargo (2009) shows a tolerant and indifferent response by the Barcelona 
administration, a repressive response by the Madrid administration and a tolerant negotiating response by 
the Bilbao administrations. 
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The global financial crisis accelerated a downturn process in Spanish real estate 
that was already apparent in 2007. During that year residential investment underwent a 
slowdown, posting a rate of increase of just 3.1%, compared with 6.4% the previous 
year (Banco de España, 2007, 27). It was clear by then that the excessive weight of the 
real estate sector in the economy (productive resources and household wealth) could not 
be maintained.  
The added problem for the Spanish economy was the high levels of debt 
acquired by families and businesses (especially by real estate and construction 
companies , and the fact that the Spanish banks and savings banks were financed by 
foreign savings. When the savings of German and French banks (among others) started 
to be redirected towards their own mortgage assets as a result of the global crisis of 
confidence, the Spanish banks became exposed. The Spanish Fund for Orderly Bank 
Restructuring (FROB)20 was created in June 2009 to readjust mainly regional savings 
banks that had proliferated with the boom and were to a considerable extent financing 
the housing boom (De la Dehesa, 2009, 454). Since then a process of mergers of 
savings banks has been underway with the financial support of FROB and under the 
supervision of the Bank of Spain.  
Without entering into a  discussion of macro-economic indicators, it should be 
mentioned that the over expansion and subsequent downturn of the real estate industry 
have both involved double negative consequences: (a) the mismatch between supply 
and demand of housing units, leaving an over-supply for sale; this has caused a large 
absorption of bank credit which is not going to be paid back easily as thousands of 
housing assets remain for sale, but which has dried up credit for other companies and 
families; (b) their direct and indirect contribution to the dramatic rise in unemployment. 
 
Housing oversupply 
There is at present an over-supply of almost 1 million housing units for sale on 
the market, 613,000 of them newly constructed with 50% located on the Mediterranean 
coast21. As in other countries, the current housing crisis in Spain has had several effects. 
One is the shift of housing ownership to financial institutions, which are absorbing the 
                                                 
20  Created by the Real Decreto Ley (Royal Decree law) 9/2009, on credit institution restructuring 
processes and enhancement of their equity. See http://www.frob.es/general/gobierno_en.html 
21 Ministerio de Vivienda  www.vivienda.es. Overcapacity is uneven in Spanish regions. Some regional 
variations are: 9% of total housing stock in Murcia and 6% in Andalusia are for sale; 5.5% in Cataluña; 
4.5% in Madrid and 2% in the Basque Country, BBVA (2010,25)  
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assets from construction industries that are defaulting22. The management of entire 
housing stocks from construction companies and developers has contributed to a 
lowering of housing prices and therefore a devaluation23 of the real estate business and 
families’ wealth. Once again there are variations among cities. In the larger cities and 
for the period 2007-2009 housing prices went down: 12% in Barcelona; 10.2% in 
Madrid; 17.1% in Valencia and 2.8 in Bilbao (Idealista.com). 
 
As the housing market shrinks, especially along the Mediterranean coast, 
financial institutions have created parallel internal branches that act as real estate agents 
(there are 63 web portals set up by financial institutions selling homes). Although this 
strategy is portrayed as temporary and only geared towards selling the housing stock 
accumulated mainly as a consequence of the closure of construction companies, the 
question remains as to how long banks will keep this up.  Some voices have been raised 
among real estate brokers complaining of unfair competition, with banks lowering 
housing prices24 in part of their housing stock by as much as 30% or even 50% 
compared to 2007. These especial banks’ promotions contrast with the overall decline in 
housing prices.   
How are households affected? Given the scale of the potential social problem of 
foreclosures – and subsequent evictions - that could occur, interesting innovative 
measures have been introduced by savings banks, such as the renegotiation of 
mortgages in accordance with the current income of the mortgage holder. This measure 
was engineered particularly for unemployed home owners with a contracted mortgage. 
Another measure involves the option of an affordable rent charged by the bank in 
anticipation of a better economic situation and with the option for the lessee to buy or to 
recuperate ownership (for those who resume the mortgage contract).  
These institutional innovations introduced by some financial institutions have 
had an impact on the banking sector. The Asociación Hipotecaría Española25 (Spanish 
                                                 
22 Between 2009 and June 2010 three of the largest real estate companies went bankrupt as banks refused 
to renegotiate credits.   
23 In 2008 the share value of the ten largest companies was reduced by 85% in relation to peak evaluation 
in 2006. (Pellicer, L. Desplome sin paracaídas, El Pais-Negocios, 8 March 2009, p:12) 
24 An interesting variant is the agreement signed by Spanish largest financial institution, Banco Santander, 
with the Association of Spanish Construction Promoters, covering 2,000 real estate intermediaries to sell 
their housing stock without an initial payment and a 20% price reduction. (Blazque, S. Las entidades 
financieras venden ladrillos in ElPais-Extra, 26 April, 2009, p: 16). 
25An organisation made up of banks, savings banks, cooperatives and credit financial institutions which 
have a major presence on the mortgage market. The members of the Association hold approximately 80% 
of the mortgage loan market. http://www.ahe.es/bocms/sites/ingles/pages/Home.jsp?mID=61 
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Mortgage Association), which represents a large part of the banking sector, has been 
lobbying to influence policy choices concerning housing tenure practices, e.g. to 
promote better rental contracts for housing owners to encourage them to rent instead of 
sell. Although there are no quantitative data available for both measures (renegotiation 
and modifying tenure for a period), it can be argued that the innovative practices 
introduced are not only preventing foreclosures, but also homelessness and social 
unrest.   
Finally, a collateral consequence of decreasing housing prices has been that 
these lower asset prices have affected credit and consumption. This is particularly 
damaging to small and medium size companies that relied on their assets to obtain 
credit, but also to families whose housing wealth represented up to 80% of their total 
wealth, prompting the fall in household consumption. 
 
Unemployment 
Job losses amount 2.3 million distributed among 1.3 million men and 700 
women26. The most affected been workers in construction (30%) and industry (20%). 
As a result of the shrinking housing market, growth in employment in the construction 
industries has receded since 2008. This has affected workers, many with temporary 
contracts (55% of the total employed in the sector), and many being foreigners 
(43.9%)27. Unemployment more than doubled from 2007 to April 2010, when 
construction workers constituted 8.6% of the active labour force. Although more than a 
third of the unemployed seem to move to jobs in another economic sector, the rest find 
employment in the informal economy or live on fixed term unemployment benefits. 
Along with immigrants, young people are the group most affected by unemployment: 
48.1% for the 16-24 age groups.   
 High unemployment levels have been recurrent in Spain. In the 1970s and early 
1980s the country also registered high levels and in 1995 the rate reached 24.5% of the 
active labour force. The social groups who have contributed to employment growth for 
over a decade are mainly immigrants and young people, many of them working with 
                                                                                                                                               
 
26 Women are better qualified and more represented in services. 
27 Between 1996 and 2007 the number of workers in the construction industries rose by 1.55 million, of 
whom 43.9% were foreigners (Banco de España, 2007, 48). 
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temporary renewable contracts28. Also, growth in the tourism, commercial and services 
sectors have absorbed women, whose participation in the labour market reached 63% in 
2008 (17.8 points more than in 1994)29. These three large groups constitute the so called 
labour market “outsiders” because in comparison with full-time protected workers – 
male breadwinners - with permanent contracts and accumulated rights, these groups30 
find it difficult to stay in the labour market over a long period of time (Polavieja, 2006; 
Garcia and Karakatsanis, 2006). While the economy was expanding, these groups 
entered and exited the labour market (and even public administrations) almost without 
interruption, allowing them to acquire goods, travel and even purchase flats, thereby 
generating part of the housing demand. At present, they are seriously affected by the 
economic crisis. 
As stated from the start of this contribution, there are still important 
geographical differences in the way the economic crisis is evolving in Spain. The four 
regions where the concentration of immigrants is most pronounced – Madrid, 
Andalusia, Catalonia and the Valencian Community - and where housing construction 
has developed to the greatest extent - are also losing the most employment. A marked 
contrast exists between unemployment in Andalusia, at 27.21%, and that in the Basque 
Country, where unemployment is 10. 91%.  (INE, Encuesta de Población Activa, 2010). 
 
Some Government policies 
 What has been done by the government? For many months since the start of the 
global financial crisis, the Spanish Prime Minister insisted that things were not as bad as 
they appeared. By spring 2010 the Spanish government was compelled to change its 
tune and to introduce hard measures.  The first wave of measures were of a Keynesian 
nature. In November 2008 the government announced the Fondo Estatal de Inversión 
Local31 (State Fund for Local Investment) with a budget of 8,000 million Euros, aimed 
at financing local public works managed by city councils for over a year, with the 
priority of creating jobs to be offered to unemployed workers (up to 400,000 direct jobs 
were expected to be created). However, this measure could only create temporary jobs. 
This programme complements the Strategic Plan for Infrastructures (2005-2020) which 
                                                 
28 Up to 90.2% of immigrants’ labour contracts were temporary, with only 9.2% permanent contracts in 
2003. in V. Porthé, M. Amable,J. Benacha, 2007, pp:36. 
29 Rojo, M (2008).  Also Massarelli, N & F. Romans, (2008). 
30 The Spanish labour market has 30% of temporary contracts, but these groups are overrepresented. 
31 Real Decreto-Ley 9/2008, de 28 de noviembre 2008. Royal Decree Law 9/2008. 
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promises more sustainable and productive works and employment and involved as 
much as 1.6% of GDP in 2008.   Other measures involving fiscal reductions and 
moratoria on mortgage repayments have been introduced to help families. Finally, in 
order to boost credit to small and medium businesses, a New Credit Line was opened 
with 10,000 million Euros (50% to be provided by banks and 50% by the ICO (Official 
Credit Institute). (El Pais., 26 April, 2009, 6). 
 The Keynesian policies introduced in Spain (as in many other countries) were 
followed by a dramatic increase in public debt and a loss of confidence in the strength 
of the Spanish economy on the part of international financial market investors. In spring 
2010 the government introduced severe cuts in public wages and social welfare, and 
more are in the pipeline. As one of the main problems is to regain confidence and 
profits for companies in order to generate employment, parliamentary debate in summer 
2010 will concentrate on further reforms of the labour market after the recent measures 
already announced 32. More flexibilization of the labour market is going to be 
introduced, along with the loss of workers’ acquired rights.    
Final notes 
 
This article started with a reference to the housing bubble in the United Stated as a 
counterpoint with the Spanish case. The analysis on the Spanish case shows the 
combination of factors leading to the bubble, the specific characteristics of a large home 
ownership sector and the problems of household debt and unemployment. As in the 
United States the real estate sector, the financial sector and households embarked on a 
dream of wealth increase. However, in Spain the strong role the family institution and 
solidarity partly explains not only the high level of home ownership but also the relative 
cushioned landing during the crisis.  
In his discussion on the vulnerability of low-middle-class home owners with the 
crisis in the United States Stiglitz (2010) stresses the distance of the banking sector 
from the communities as a factor explaining high levels of foreclosures. In Spain local 
savings banks were deeply involved in granting business loans to constructors and 
mortgages to consumers as owners of the mortgage assets. This is why they needed to 
engineer innovative practices for the renegotiation of mortgage contracts to 
homeowners. However, they have to deal with thousands of housing assets from 
                                                 
32 The Spanish government has issued the Royal Decree of the urgent measures for the reform of the 
labour market in June 2010.  
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bankrupt constructors. This factor is causing considerable stress in these banks and has 
led to a restructuring of the sector under the supervision of the Bank of Spain and 
international supervisors. 
An important characteristic of the Spanish urban growth model has been 
regional differences. There are clear differences between the overcapacity of housing on 
the Mediterranean coast (Cataluña, Valencia Community, Murcia and Andalusia), 
Madrid and the Basque Country. Whereas in the latter the crisis is less painful thanks to 
a more balanced growth model in Madrid and on the Mediterranean coast the negative 
consequences of the neo-liberal growth model is clearly shown in overcapacity of 
housing and high levels of unemployment. 
Finally, unemployment is once again the scourge of Spain reinforcing family 
solidarity. Unemployment is affecting the working population in general. However, it is 
especially the vulnerable groups – young cohorts and immigrants - those with 
temporary contracts and those working in the construction sector (a good deal of 
overlap here) who are the losers. The young continue to be supported by their families; 
immigrants also rely on the family institution. Thus the current crisis is reinforcing the 
path-dependent cultural feature of familism in Spain. This will be compounded by 
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